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We examine how political connections impact the process of going public. 
Specifically, we test how political connections impact the pricing of newly offered 
shares, the magnitude of underpricing, and the fixed cost of going public. Based 
on experiences of the new public firms in the Chinese security markets and using 
multiple measures of political connections, we find robust evidence that issuing 
firms with political connections reap significant preferential benefits from going 
public. To be specific, we find that firms – irrespective of ownership 
arrangements – with greater political connections have higher offering prices, less 
underpricing, and lower fixed costs during the going-public process. 
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Yritysten poliittiset yhteydet ja listautuminen pörssiin 
Kiinassa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 7/2009 
Bill B. Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – Xian Sun 




Tässä työssä tarkastellaan poliittisten kytkentöjen vaikutusta yritysten listautumi-
seen pörssissä. Tutkimuksessa testataan, miten yritysten poliittiset yhteydet vai-
kuttavat uusien markkinoille tarjottujen osakkeiden hinnoitteluun, alihinnoittelun 
suuruuteen ja listautumisesta aiheutuviin kiinteisiin kustannuksiin. Uusien kiina-
laisten pörssiyhtiöiden listautumisesta saatujen kokemusten ja useiden poliittisia 
yhteyksiä kuvaavien mittareiden perusteella voidaan sanoa, että läheisiin poliitti-
siin yhteyksiin päässeitä yrityksiä suositaan listautumisvaiheessa. Tutkimuksen tu-
lokset viittaavat siihen, että yrityksen osakkeiden tarjoushinta on korkeampi, 
osakkeiden alihinnoittelu vähäisempää ja listautumisesta aiheutuvat kiinteät kus-
tannukset pienemmät, kun yritys vahvistaa poliittisia yhteyksiään. 
 
Avainsanat: poliittiset yhteydet, listautumisanti, kehittyvät taloudet 
 
JEL-luokittelu: H0, G3, G24, G32, G34, G38  
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Political connections are shown to have significant impact on the overall economy 
and the economic life of individual firms (Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2008), 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2008), Ferguson and Voth (2008), 
Khwaja and Mian (2005), Sun and Tong (2003), Qi, Wu and Zhang (2000), 
Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Christopher (2000), Faccio (2006), Cheung, 
Jing, Raghavendra and Stouraitis (2005), Fisman (2001), Sapienza (2004), Fan, 
Wong and Zhang (2007), Faccio, Masulis, McConnell and Offenberg Faccio 
(2006), and Charumilind, Kali and Wiwattanakantang (2006)). These studies have 
examined firms’ political connections in various aspects, ranging from the firms’ 
terms of borrowing, market valuation, long term performance, bail out events, to 
the competing for government contracts. 
  However, how political connections bring value to firms during their 
respective process of going public – an important corporate event for firms 
entering capital markets – has not been examined extensively. Our paper attempts 
to void that gap by investigating the relation between political connections and 
firm value by examining the effect of political connections on the cost and pricing 
and therefore the valuation of Chinese firms going public during the 1990s. There 
are several reasons that make China a suitable laboratory to examine the impact of 
political connections on firm value in general and, in particular, on the value of 
firms going public. The first reason is that there are clear quantitative restrictions 
imposed by the government on firms during the going public process. To be 
specific, there is a limit on the number of companies that can go public and the 
maximum number of shares issued in a given year. In addition, the offer price is 
restricted by the firms’ profitability and an assigned multiplier (P/E ratio), which 
is decreed by the government. The significance of this latter restriction is that it is 
an important determinant of the offer price and therefore the amount of proceeds 
that can be raised. These government imposed restrictions on the going public 
process clearly invite firms to seek values through political connections, therefore 
making the discussion relevant and important. 
  A second reason is that given the importance of the emerging Chinese 
financial markets in the global economy, the accompanying importance of the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in general, and the need of firms 
to raise funds, it is important to have a complete understanding of the impact of 
political connections in the going public process. Indeed, the fluctuations of 
Chinese stock markets, often triggered by the government policy changes, are 
affecting domestic investors and investors in other countries profoundly. For 
example, on February 27, 2007, because Chinese investors concerned that the 
government may actively seek to cool China’s market, Shanghai’s index plunged 
8.8%, and this tumble was followed by 1.3% fall on India’s Sensitive Index, 3.3%  
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fall on Russia’s RTS Index and by the nearly 400 points fall on the Dow 
industrials.
1 
  Finally, due to the uniqueness of the China’s security markets it is possible to 
identify several proxy measures of political connections. The first of these is the 
number of ex- and/or current government officials that belong to the board of 
directors. Most firms going public are state-owned enterprises (or SOEs) and can 
only be partially privatized so that the state maintains control. Consequently, an 
important characteristic of these firms for the present paper is that even after 
going public the board of directors of these firms is dominated by former or 
current government officials. Thus, although all SOEs are, to some extent, 
politically connected, those that have important current or ex-government officials 
on their boards would be characterized by stronger political connections. 
  The second proxy measure of political connections is the magnitude and 
strength of an underwriter’s political connections. A characteristic of China’s 
capital markets during the 1990s is that all bookrunners are state-owned. That is, 
most of these bookrunners are sponsored by state councils, the Central Bank or 
provincial governments. As a proxy for the magnitude and strength of a 
bookrunner’s political connection, we use the extent of their involvement in 
taking the largest state-owned firms public. There are only about 30 out of 
approximately one hundred investment banks approved by the Chinese Securities 
Regulation Committee (CRSC thereafter) that can assume the role of the 
bookrunner. Importantly, only five of these bookrunners were the lead in 59 of the 
100 largest state IPOs, which account for almost 70% of total proceeds raised by 
these offerings. We make the assumption that it is the investment banks with the 
strongest political connections that are most likely to attract the most lucrative 
deals. 
  For the third proxy measure of political connections we use the types of state 
ownership. Firms within China are characterized by different state ownership. For 
example, there is state ownership directly controlled and managed by the 
government or its authorized agents and state ownership managed by other state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Several studies of share issue privatization have 
examined the impact of state ownership on firm value (see eg Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988), Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), Jacquillat (1987), Perroti and Guney (1993), 
and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997)). However, because of data limitations these 
studies could not account for the strength of political connections among SOEs. 
The Chinese experience allows us to address this weakness in the existing 
literature. 
  Although we use the types and the amount of state ownership in defining the 
strength of the firms’ political connections, we suggest that one should not link 
state ownership with political connections directly in Chinese markets given that, 
                                                 
1 ‘Shanghai’s 8.8% Tumble Slams Emerging Markets’, WSJ, February 28, 2007.  
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to some extent, all state-owned companies are politically connected. The political 
connections that we define in this paper would distinguish the firms’ ability in 
extracting values from such relationships, a method which may reveal that those 
state-owned companies without strong political connections are actually not 
entitled with significantly higher benefits than those non-state firms. 
  Using a sample of 423 domestic IPOs during 1994 to 1999, we find that 
firms’ political connections play a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful role in the process of going public. To be specific, if the issuing firms 
(i) have board members who in the past- or are currently working for the 
government at least at a level equal or higher than a city mayor; (ii) use 
bookrunners that participated actively in the 100 largest state-owned IPOs; (iii) 
have the majority of shares controlled by the central government or other SOEs; 
and (iv) have any combination of the three, they are more likely to receive a 
higher than the median P/E ratio (a multiplier to determine the offering price) 
from the government. This finding indicates that, all else equal, these firms would 
get a higher offer price because of their political connections. Importantly, we 
show that the political connections variables, eg the connected board members 
and the connected bookrunners, are not redundant measurements of the state 
ownership. Specifically, we find that without additional political connections, 
state-owned firms experience almost the same level of underpricing as those of 
the less connected non-state firms. 
  Our results indicate that the market recognizes that these connected firms are 
overpriced relatively to less connected firms, and investors, despite the huge 
demand for new shares in the Chinese security markets, buy these shares at a price 
not significantly higher than the offer price thus resulting in lower underpricing. 
These connected firms also pay relatively lower fees during the going public 
process. The evidence of the potential benefits of political connections is robust 
for both state-owned and non-state firms. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
related literature. Section 3 briefly discusses the background of China’s security 
markets and the measurements of political connections. Section 4 discusses the 
data and provides summary statistics. Section 5 presents evidence on the 
relationship between political connections and the pricing of IPOs, the level of 





2 Literature  review 
Since Krueger’s (1974) seminal work, numerous attempts have been undertaken 
to estimate the value of political connection in a market economy. It has been 
shown to have significant impact on firms’ market values. For example, Fisman 
(2001) estimates the value of political connections on firms’ market value by 
using the relationship of public firms in Indonesia with the former president 
Suharto. Consistent with the argument that political connections add value to 
firms, he finds that connected firms experienced significantly lower abnormal 
returns at the announcement of the deterioration of Suharto’s health. This finding 
shows that the value added to firms because of political connections drops when 
there is a possible decline or reduction in the strength of political connections. 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2008) find that Thailand firms 
experience dramatic market value increases once their owner win the election to 
run for the top office. They suggest that those elected business owners use their 
power to shape policies in favor to their firms. Ferguson and Voth (2008) 
investigate the value of connections between German industry and the Nazi 
movement in 1933. They find that firms with substantial links with Nazi 
experienced unusually high stock returns between January and March 1933 when 
Hitler was appointed Chancellor. 
  Sapienza (2004) studies the effects of government ownership on bank lending 
behavior and finds that, state-owned companies receive lower interest rates when 
borrowin g from state-owned banks and that the stronger is the political party in a 
given region, the lower is the interest rates charged to connected firms. These 
results provide evidence that state-owned banks are a mechanism for supplying 
patronage. Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) show that connected firms 
substantially increase their bank leverage after election. Charumilind, Kali and 
Wiwattanakantang (2006) find that Thailand firms with political connections had 
greater access to long-term loans with less collateral needed. Khwaja and Mian 
(2005) show that firms with political connections borrow 45 percent more and 
have 50 percent higher default rates. On the other hand, Faccio, Masulis, 
McConnell, and Offenberg (2006) find that politically connected firms are more 
likely to be bailed out when facing problems than are non-connected firms. Leuz 
and Oberholzer-Gee (2005) investigate the benefits received by politically 
connected firms in capital markets by examining their likelihood of global 
financing. They show that in a market where political intervention is pervasive, 
firms with fewer political connections have a greater likelihood of going outside 
the country to raise funds. 
  There is also evidence in the literature that political connections may destroy 
firm value. Cheung, Jing, Raghavendra, and Stouraitis (2005) show that political 
connections are detrimental to minority shareholders, a conclusion that is  
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consistent with the ‘grabbing hand’ model of government by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998). Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000) present evidence 
that in countries where official corruption is high, firms are more likely to hide 
output so as to reduce appropriation. 
  One of the most important corporate financing strategies that is yet to be 
addressed formally in the political connections literature is the process of going 
public. As discussed above, the papers that come the closest to address this issue 
are those belonging to the share issue privatization (SIP) literature, in which they 
focus on the underpricing of SOEs during privatization. Jenkinson and Mayer 
(1988), and Perroti and Guney (1993), among others, find that underpricing is 
greater for IPOs of state-owned issuers than that of privately owned firms. 
However, Dewenter and Malatesta’s (1997), using SOEs from UK, Canada and 
Malaysia, find no significant difference in underpricing between the privatized 
SOE firms relative to the private company IPOs. Thus the issue as to the impact of 
political connections on the underpricing of IPOs is still unresolved. 
  Fan et al (2007) focus on post-IPO firm performance, examining long-run 
stock returns, earnings growth and sales growth. They also examine the 
relationship between politically connected CEOs and the first day stock return. 
They find that there is a negative relationship between the CEO’s political ties and 
the issuing firms’ initial return. They interpret this negative effect as a signal of 
government intervention, which depresses the initial returns on the first day of 
trading. Although their interpretation is insightful, the question remains whether 
and how politically connected CEOs effect the process of going public. 
Furthermore, government intervention on one hand may reduce the efficiency of 
the economy as a whole, but on the other hand, it means support to politically 
connected firms which may alleviate investor fears of bankruptcy. Therefore, it is 
not necessarily bad news for investors if firms CEOs are politically connected. 
 
 
3  Political connections and China’s security 
markets 
Two decades ago there were only two listed stocks in what today is known as the 
Shanghai Exchange. Since then, the number of listed stocks has rapidly increased 
to 1,224 and the cumulative amount of capital raised by listed companies was 882 
billion RMB (about 106.65 billion US dollars)
2 by the end of 2002. Included in 
this number are state-owned firms that have been partially privatized by IPOs. 
This latter phenomenon is being driven by the need of the government to raise 
                                                 
2 The exchange rate used is $1=RMB8.27.  
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capital from the private sector to reform the heavily indebted state-owned 
enterprises that had become a serious fiscal burden. 
  Although the rapid growth of China’s capital markets is impressive, certain 
fundamental features have yet to be changed. One of the most important is that the 
government still plays a significant role in these markets by controlling the going 
public process. Before describing our measurements of political connections, we 




3.1 Institutional  characteristics  of China’s security markets 
3.1.1 Quota 
During the sample period, the State Planning Commission, the People’s Banks of 
China, and the CSRC determined the aggregate amount of new shares (quota) that 
can be issued each year. These shares were distributed to individual provinces and 
assigned to those companies that were perceived to have an important stake in 
local economic development. 
  Most firms in the security markets are state-owned and are relatively older 
and larger. Although SOEs are usually thought of as being less likely to be 
successful if they were in a more market-oriented environment, and some of them 
are indeed disappearing, those that attempt to go public and are therefore willing 
to be scrutinized by variant stakeholders are likely to be stronger firms. Before 
going public there are certain thresholds that firms must meet. Applying firms 
must be limited liability companies (LLCs); they should have no record of any 
severe violations against laws and ‘social welfare’; must have at least three years 
operating history and positive profits for the past three consecutive years; and 
after going public the number of shareholders who hold at least 1,000 shares must 
be no less than 1,000. Meeting these requirements, however, does not guarantee 
that the applying companies will get approval. This is the case because there are 
only a limited number of companies that are allowed to go public in a given year. 
Additionally, given the underlying reasons for the creation of China’s security 
markets and the existence of the quota system, it is very difficult for a non-state 
firm to compete with their state-owned counterparts for their share of the quota in 




3.1.2 Pricing  cap 
A stock’s issuing price is fixed once registration with the stock trading system has 
occurred.
3 The offer price is chosen months before the market trading starts, and 
there is no feedback mechanism through market demand that allows adjustments 
in the offer price. The offer price is suggested by the issuing company and the 
bookrunner, and then verified by the CSRC. The calculation of the offering price 
takes the following form 
 
P0 (the offer price) = Profits/Share * P/E ratio  (3.1) 
 
As shown in equation (3.1), there are two main determinants of an issuing firm’s 
offer price: the profitability of the issuing company and the P/E ratio, which is a 
given multiplier determined by the CSRC. The multiplier range during our sample 
period was 13 to 16. 
 
 
3.1.3 Untradable  shares 
Shares in China’s security markets are divided in to two broad categories: non-
tradable and tradable shares.
4 According to the Administrative Rules of Security 
Issuings and Trading published in 1993, the number of tradable shares issued to 
the public at IPO should be no less than the 25% of the total number of issued 
shares. This requirement may be relaxed for firms with a total number of issued 
shares more than 400 millions. State-owned shares remain untradable even after 
the company has gone public. The partial share issue privatization and the 
required dilution in the ownership of tradable shares secure the controlling 
position of the state in SOEs after they go public. The fixed supply of shares and 
                                                 
3 Based on Article 28 of the Securities Law, ‘In cases of premium issuance (that is shares are 
issued at a higher than the face value price), the issuing price shall be negotiated and determined 
between the issuer and the underwriter, subject to the verification of the securities regulatory 
agency under the State Council.’ 
4 At present Chinese companies going public have the option of issuing A shares, B shares, H 
shares, N shares and S shares. The differences are where they are listed and who can own and 
trade them. A shares are domestic shares which mean that they are listed in Shanghai Exchange 
and Shenzhen Exchange (the only two exchanges in mainland China) and can only be purchased 
by Chinese citizens residing in mainland China. B shares are those listed in mainland China with 
RMB facial value but purchased by investors outside of mainland China by US dollars if listed in 
Shanghai exchange or Hong Kong (HK) dollars if in Shenzhen exchange. H shares are those listed 
in Hong Kong exchange and can only be purchased by investors outside of mainland China. N 
shares and S shares are similar to H shares but are listed on the New York Exchange and the 
Singapore Exchange, respectively. At the end of 1997, 42 companies successfully went public 
outside of mainland China, of these 31 listed in HK, 6 listed in both HK and NY, 2 in both HK and 
London, only 2 in NY and 1 in Singapore. The gross proceeds from these listings were about $9.56 
billion.  
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the imposed P/E ratio indicate that government intervention has a significant 
impact on the going public process. 
 
 
3.2 Measures  of  political connections 




3.2.1  The political connection of board members 
Because the state remains the controlling shareholder following the going public 
of SOEs, quite often the members of the board of directors are also government 
officials. According to the Company Code of 1993, the board members of state-
owned companies are assigned by State Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). All boards of 
directors of state-owned companies are assigned and compensated by SASAC and 
therefore have a certain level of political connection. In addition, firms with 
boards that have directors who have or have held government positions would 
have stronger ties with the government suggesting that these firms would be more 
politically connected. 
  Although non-state firms cannot have board members that currently work for 
the government, they can have retired officers, which because of Chinese culture 
virtually guarantees them a significant level of political connection. As a result 
(these) firms are usually very aggressive in recruiting former high ranking 
officials. The economic benefits provided by this strategy are of interest and will 
be examined below. 
  We obtain data on the strength of politically connected boards of directors by 
manually examining the prospectus of each IPO during the sample period and 
identify the background of each board member.
5 Board members who used to 
work for or are currently working for the government at the level of a city mayor 
or higher are defined as politically connected. The positions and government 
agencies that are identified in the sample include: city mayor, head of provincial 
tax bureau, provincial governors, director of the central or local economic 
planning committee, and director of the central or local SASAC. We are not able 
to identify in more details which connection is the strongest because even though 
the central government and its agents have the ultimate power over decisions 
                                                 
5 Fan et al (2007) define political connections by the background of CEO. We therefore conducted 
some additional testing based on our sample and re-estimated the entire relevant results using CEO 
connection as the proxy of political connection rather than the board. We do find significant results 
that are consistent with the reported result in the text.  
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made by provincial or local governments, it is the provincial or local governments 
that have the strongest incentives to help the rent-seeking firms so as to fulfill 
local fiscal goals. We therefore use a dummy variable equal to 1, if the issuing 




3.2.2  The political connections of bookrunners 
It is well known that one of the most important participants in the process of 
going public is the underwriter. Within China, underwriters are particularly 
important given the institutional features of the going public process. First, they 
work with the firms to get the approval from CRSC to get the ‘quota’. The process 
stops if an approval is not obtained. As is the case in other economies, they play a 
significant role in determining the offer price. However, because of the unique 
institutional features of China, their role takes on an even greater importance by 
influencing the P/E ratios. 
  There are about 90 investment banks in China of which only 32 are allowed to 
assume the role as bookrunners. They are all state-owned investment banks and 
we conjecture that state-owned investment banks are a mechanism for supplying 
patronage in China’s security markets, especially during the process of going 
public. Of the 32 bookrunners, 5 of them were the bookrunners for 59 of the 100 
largest state IPOs over our sample period. The parent companies of these five 
intermediaries are powerful forces in the governmental hierarchy (eg the Central 
Bank of China, State Council, and Shanghai government) thus implying that these 
intermediaries would be well connected politically. We therefore make the 
assumption that the most politically connected investment banks are the ones that 
participate most frequently in the largest IPOs. As such, we define a politically 
connected underwriter if it is one of the 5 leading underwriters. Table 1 provides 
details of the involvement of these 5 banks in the 100 largest state IPOs. 
  There are several additional reasons why we use the underwriting of the 
largest state IPOs as a measure of investment banks’ political connection. First, 
the amount of going public fees collected by these five investment banks are 
estimated to be $271 million dollars during the sample period, more than the 
aggregated amount of fees earned by the other 27 certified bookrunners. Given 
that the underwriting process was virtually risk-free business during our sample 
period because of the tremendous demand for the shares, it is reasonable to 
believe that only those who have the closest relationship with the government are 
more likely to get chosen to underwrite the largest offerings. Second, because of 
the ‘quota’ system in the primary markets, in periods when the central 
government intends to tighten the supply of IPOs, they assign limited ‘passes’ to 
                                                 
6 We also tried the number of connected members and obtained qualitatively similar results.  
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those most connected investment banks (the top 5). Therefore, the ranking of 
underwriters reflects the strength of their relationship with the government and 
can be used as a measure of political connection. 
 
 
3.2.3  The strength of political connections of SOEs 
During the transition from a centrally controlled economy to a market driven one, 
China’s economy experienced a rapid increase in the involvement of firms 
belonging to the private sector. Nevertheless it is still the case that most of the 
listed companies are state-owned enterprises that are partially privatized. Among 
the IPOs floated in China’s stock markets during our sample period, about 70% of 
the shares were state-owned in the pre-IPO period and 50% in the post-IPO 
period. An explanation for this dominance of SOEs is that state-owned firms were 
the initial catalyst for the existence of China’s security markets. Further, because 
the CRSC determines quotas state-owned firms are more likely to receive 
favorable treatment than non-state owned firms. 
  To measure the strength of political connections based on the type of 
ownership, we divide our sample firms according to their controlling shareholders 
prior to going public into State-Owned and Non-State.
7 To distinguish the strength 
of political connections among State-Owned IPOs, we break down the sample 
further into State firms that have the central government or its agents as the 
controlling shareholder and State-Legal Entity firms that have other SOEs as the 
controlling shareholder. Both State and State-Legal Entity firms are State-Owned 
companies and by constitution belong to the central government and should in 
theory operate in a way that is beneficial to all Chinese citizens. The major 
difference between State and State-Legal Entity firms is that State-Legal Entity 
firms can independently allocate the legally delegated state-owned properties. 
Additionally, the government or its authorities can (and do) send people directly 
to sit on the board of State firms, while both the board of directors and the top 
managers of State-Legal Entity firms are assigned by their parent SOEs. 
  Given that State-Legal Entity firms have the right to allocate the delegated 
state-owned resources without direct intervention of the government, we believe 
that they operate more like a firm in a market driven economy than their State 
counterparts and therefore have fewer political connections. Sun and Tong (2003) 
also suggest that legal entities behave differently from the state government. Non-
State firms experience little intervention (and support) from the government. To 
identify the type of ownership, we examine the prospectus of all the IPOs in the 
sample and identify the largest shareholder of the firms prior to the offer date. 
                                                 
7 The controlling order of the owners does not change in the post IPO stage.  
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  During our sample period, the number of non-tradable shares accounts for 
70% of the total number of shares of the listed companies. Table 2 illustrates the 
ownership structure of issuing firms prior to and subsequent to the IPO. Panel B 
of table 2 shows that the percentage of non-tradable shares is allocated in the 
following manner: (1) shares owned by the State accounts for 48.3%, of which the 
number of shares owned by the central government accounts for 17.5% and the 
number of shares owned by other State-Legal Entity (parent SOEs) accounts for 
30.8% and (2) shares owned by Non-State firms accounts for 21.7%. 
  The empirical evidence from the share issue privatization literature indicates 
that state-owned enterprises are not more underpriced at the initial public offering 
than their private sector counterparts (see eg Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), Perroti 
and Guney (1993), and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997)). However, we expect 
SOEs going public in China to be less underpriced for several reasons. 
  First, as mentioned earlier, China’s security markets were created to solve the 
financing problems of SOEs. The traditional subsidized loans, in most cases 
disbursed to the state sectors, had created a significant fiscal burden to the 
government and resulted in many bad debts. Both financial officials and political 
leaders were looking for a way out. It is therefore highly unlikely that security 
markets designed by the state to meet such fiscal needs would be ready to 
discount its own companies more significantly than others. 
  Second, state-owned managers do not necessarily have fewer incentives to 
reduce underpricing. As the agent of the people’s assets both prior to and after the 
process of going public, state-owned managers would enjoy higher managerial 
discretion with reduced underpricing or increased capital. Just as managers of 
public companies in developed markets may prefer to issue seasoned equity 
offerings so as to reduce their firms’ leverage ratio and increase managerial 
discretion, China’s State-Owned company managers may also want to reduce 
underpricing in initial public offerings. Furthermore, in a socialistic system where 
politics and the management of State-Owned properties are not clearly 
distinguished, managing a bigger corporation adds political clout. 
  Therefore, we expect that firms with political connections should, all else 
equal, experience relatively higher offering prices, less underpricing and lower 
fixed costs in the process of going public. Also, if we take State-Legal Entity 
firms as a product of the transition from the old central-planned economy, we 





4  Data and summary statistics 
4.1 Data 
The list of companies going public is obtained from the New Issues of the 
Security Data Corporation (SDC). We exclude IPOs by financial institutions and 
mutual funds. The data for board members, ownership variables and firm specific 
characteristics are collected manually from the individual prospectus of the IPO 
firms. In addition, the variables taken from the SDC database are cross-checked 
by comparing them with the information on the prospectuses. The final sample is 
comprised of 423 firm commitment IPOs of A-share common stocks over the 
1994 to 1999 time period. We choose this time period because there were no 
drastic regulatory changes in the security markets,
8 especially the method of 
calculating the IPO offer price. Because the offer price is determined by the 
issuing firm’s profits per share and a given P/E ratio (multiplier) and because we 
also use the level of the given P/E ratio to analyze the strength of the firm’s 
political connections, to get a clean measure of this variable we restrict our sample 
to this time period.
9 
  As discussed earlier, to facilitate the understanding of the impact of political 
connections on the going public process, we divide the sample into three groups 
according to their controlling shareholder prior to the IPO: State, State-Legal 
Entity and Non-State IPOs. Table 3 presents the distribution by industry of IPOs 
by State, State-Legal Entity and Non-State firms. Among the sample of 423 IPOs, 
159 (38%) are issued by State firms, 213 (50%) by State-Legal Entity firms, and 
51 (12%) by Non-State firms. State-Owned enterprises, including both State and 
State-Legal Entity ones, account for 88% of the total issuing firms in the sample 
period. The majority of the issuing firms are from manufacturing industries which 
accounts for about 66% of the total sample. State-Owned firms dominate IPOs 
from industries such as electronic service, natural resource and telephone 
communication, which is a reflection of policy preference of the state. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Prior to 1994 shares were issued at RMB 1. As pointed out by Su et al (1999) and others, this led 
to extremely large amount of underpricing. The government relaxed restrictions on pricing (eg 
removing the restrictions on the range of the P/E ratio) after 1999. 
9 As mentioned earlier, the offer price is restricted by the firms’ profitability and an assigned 
multiplier (P/E ratio), which is decreed by the government. The profitability is measured by 
considering firms’ historical profitability as well as the projected ones. To make the results 
comparable, we estimate and use the firms’ historical profitability for the whole sample.  
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4.2 Summary  statistics 
Table 4 presents summary statistics by the type of issuing firms. Columns 1 to 3 
report the average value of each variable for the three types of firms: State, State-
Legal Entity and Non-State firms. The t-statistics of the difference between the 
groups are reported in columns 4 to 6. Columns 7 to 11 report the summary 
statistics for the total sample. 
  Panel A in table 4 reports the statistics for the political connection 
measurements. Almost half of the State-Owned IPOs have at least one board 
member who used to work for or is currently working for the government or its 
authorities. For Non-State IPOs, only about 20% have connected board members. 
The difference in the percentage of politically connected board members between 
these IPOs and those of each of the other two groupings is significant at the 1% 
level. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the use of connected 
bookrunners between the different types of IPOs ownership. This finding is 
probably due to the fact that about 50% of each group has connected investment 
banks as its bookrunners. It seems that although investment banks are state-
owned, they also work with Non-State IPOs. The important issue then is whether 
they treat State-Owned firms differently from Non-State ones in the process of 
going public with regards to the pricing of shares, the level of underpricing and 
the spread. This issue will be discussed below. For both types of State-Owned 
IPOs, ownership is highly concentrated with the majority owners being either the 
central government or the parent SOEs prior to the offering. The percentage of 
shares owned by these institutions for each type of State-Owned IPOs accounts 
for 68.6% and 85.4% respectively, prior to going public. 
  Finally, to get an overall measure of political connection for each firm, we 
create a Political Connection Index, which is a summation of the three different 
measures of political connections. Because all of the individual political 
connection measures are binominal, the political connections index ranges in 
value from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates the lowest level of political connections and 3 
the highest. As shown in the bottom row of Panel A, the State IPOs have an 
average connection of 1.931 and State-Legal Entity IPOs have a value of 2.014. 
For the Non-State IPO firms, the mean value of the political connection index is 
less than one, with the difference between the other ownership groups being 
significant at the 1% level. 
  Panel B reports firm specific summary statistics. State-Legal Entity IPOs have 
the highest average value of assets prior to the offering at $96.1 million US 
dollars and Non-State IPOs have the lowest at $43.4 million US dollars with the 
difference being significant at the 1% level. While larger in size, State-Owned 
IPOs also have higher leverage ratios. Both types of State-Owned IPOs have 
leverage ratios over 50% while Non-State IPOs have below 50% and the  
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difference is statistically significant at convention levels as shown in columns 5 
and 6. The significantly higher debt ratio between State-Owned and Non-State 
IPOs is consistent with one of the arguments made earlier for the development of 
the stock market in China – the financing of heavily indebted SOEs. Thus, given 
that one of the goals of the creation of the security markets is to reduce the fiscal 
burden created by the borrowings of the SOEs, the extent to which they are 
leveraged should therefore be an important factor in determining the impact of 
political connections on the going public process. It is therefore expected that 
because the government significantly effects the IPO offer price, firms with higher 
debt ratios should, all else equal, get a higher offer price. We attempt to answer 
this question below with cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the offer 
price. 
  Panel C reports the summary statistics related to the offerings. We see that 
controlling for size differences, the average amount of proceeds raised is 
significantly smaller for Non-State IPOs than that of State-Owned IPOs. State-
Legal Entity IPOs raised the highest proceeds of $42.8 million U.S. dollars and 
Non-State IPOs raised the lowest at $30 million. Additionally, State-Owned IPOs 
pay significantly lower fees per dollar raised than do Non-State ones. Specifically, 
both State and State-Legal Entity IPOs paid about $ 0.036 per dollar raised, while 
Non-State ones paid $ 0.040 with the difference in fees being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results provide the first set of evidence that 
State-Owned IPOs might have benefited from their political connections.
10 
  One of the unique characteristics of the process of going public in China is the 
lottery drawing in the case of oversubscription. According to the ‘Interim 
Directive for Securities Issuings and Subscription by Chinese Securities 
Regulation Committee’ issued on December 26th, 1996, if there are 
oversubscriptions, a lottery will be used to determine the allocation of new shares. 
During the sample period, state-owned or not, almost all IPOs were 
oversubscribed.
11 Using the level of oversubscription as a proxy for the demand of 
an IPO we expect that, ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between the 
level of underpricing and oversubscription. This is the case because higher 
demand is likely to bid up the first day trading price therefore leading to a higher 
level of underpricing. Next we describe in detail our measure of oversubscription. 
  In China’s A-shares market, all domestic investors can register to buy a 
certain amount of new shares.
12 The most popular purchasing method during the 
sample period is for investors to subscribe through the internet. If the number of 
                                                 
10 Note that this may not be entirely due to economics of scale since there is no difference in costs 
between ‘State’ and ‘State-Legal Entity’ IPOs despite that ‘State-Legal Entity’ having 
substantially larger amounts of funds. 
11 There is only one observation in the sample that is not oversubscribed, which is ‘Bai Da 
Corporation’. 
12 They must be the multiple of 1,000 and can not exceed one thousandth of the total number of 
shares issued to the public.  
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shares subscribed is exactly equal to the amount of shares offered to the public, 
every investor gets exactly the amount of shares they requested. If the number of 
shares requested is less than the number of shares offered then each investor gets 
the requested number of shares and the rest of the offer is taken by the investment 
bank. Finally, if the number of shares requested is higher than the total amount 
issued, the computers at the listing exchanges would generate continuous numbers 
for each 1,000 shares and randomly draw ‘winning’ numbers. The odds would be 
the ratio of the total number of shares issued to the total number of shares 
requested. Hence, the investors requesting the most shares, within the limit, gets 
the most drawing numbers and is therefore most likely to beat the odds. It should 
be noted however, that under this method of share allocation there is no guarantee 
that all investors who requested shares would end up receiving shares. 
  There are two other kinds of purchasing methods and the difference between 
these methods and that of purchasing via the internet is that each subscriber is 
allocated some shares according to the odds ratio. However, irrespective of the 
purchase method used, the odd, which is the ratio of the number of shares issued 
to the number of shares requested, can be referred to as a measure of the 
‘popularity’ of a particular stock. Since there is a cap on the shares that can be 
requested per investor, a higher number of registrations results in a higher number 
of oversubscriptions and a lower number for the Lottery ratio, which therefore 
indicates higher demand for a particular IPO. 
  Panel C of Table 4 shows that the odds of getting a share of Non-State IPOs 
are significantly lower than for both types of State-Owned IPOs. Specifically, the 
odds for Non-State IPOs are 9 in a thousand and are 26 in a thousand for State 
ones. The significantly different Lottery ratios suggest that investors have a 
preference for Non-State IPOs compared to State-Owned ones. In sum, the 
summary statistics reported in Table 4 suggest that State-Owned IPOs have 
stronger political connections, are larger in size, have a higher debt level, and 
have significantly less demand than do Non-State IPOs. 
  We pointed out earlier that the offer price is determined by the offering firm’s 
profitability and a given P/E ratio. The CRSC specifies that ‘a P/E ratio from a 
comparable public firm should be the method used to determine the appropriate 
P/E ratio’. Although there might be some variation in the P/E ratios a firm can get, 
they have to fall into the range determined by the CRSC. During the sample 
period, all IPOs are assigned a P/E ratio ranging from 13 to 16. Rather than 
measuring risks and growth as is generally the case for developed markets, the 
P/E ratio that is used to determine the offer price in China’s security markets can 
be thought of as a multiplier that the government uses to control the issuing price 
of IPOs. Therefore, the amount of capital that a firm can raise when it goes public 
depends heavily on the P/E ratio it gets, given its level of prior profitability. 
  To provide evidence on how political connections impact the pricing of newly 
offered shares, we examine how often firms get a higher than the median  
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multiplier and how much higher it is from the median. It is important to realize 
that during the sample period, the definition of profitability used to calculate the 
offer price changed several times. During the period prior to 1997, forecasted 
profitability is used to determine the offer price and recorded in the prospectus; 
while from 1997 to 1998, historical profitability over the past three years was used 
to determine the offer price and after 1999, a combination of both is applied. To 
make the results comparable over the sample period, we collected the historical 
profitability of all the firms over the three years prior to the issuance and divided 
the offer price with this measure to get the actual P/E ratios that firms received. 
  The following example illustrates the calculation. Northwest Bearing went 
public in 1996 and as written in its prospectus, its offer price is RMB 4.15, 
determined by a projected profitability of RMB 0.306 per share and a multiplier 
(given P/E ratio) of 13.07. To make its reported P/E ratio comparable with those 
determined by historical profitability, we collected its profitability from its annual 
reports in the past three years. According to its annual reports from 1993 to 1995, 
the historical profitability of this firm was 0.320 0.328, and 0.205 respectively per 
share.
13 The average historical profitability therefore is 0.284, which implies that 
the actual multiplier Northwest Bearing gets to issue at RMB 4.15 per share 
should have been 14.61 if historical profitability method is used. Since the median 
of the government suggested P/E ratio is 14.5 (of a range from 13 to 16), 
Northwest Bearing gets a higher than median P/E ratio. 
  Panel A of Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the level of underpricing 
and its related variables for the total sample of IPOs. The average degree of 
underpricing is 116.2% and the average offer price is RMB 6.088. The average 
three year profits per share are RMB 0.359 and the actual P/E ratio is 18.808 if the 
historical profitability were applied to all firms instead of the projected one. 
About 76% of IPOs have a higher than median P/E ratio. The mean deviation of 
the actual P/E ratio from the median is 4.248. 
  Panel B of Table 5 reports the summary statistics for underpricing for the type 
of firms. Average values are reported in columns (1) to (3) and t-statistics for the 
difference between the means are reported in the last three columns. Non-State 
IPOs experience a significantly higher level of underpricing than State-Owned 
IPOs. Specifically, Non-State IPOs experience 130.5% underpricing while State 
and State-Legal Entity IPOs experience 114.2% and 114.3%, respectively. The 
difference is significant at the 5% significance level. The historical profitability of 
Non-State IPOs is RMB 0.475 per share which is significantly higher than that for 
State (0.335) and State-Legal Entity (0.349) IPOs. Nevertheless they receive a 
significantly lower multiplier (P/E ratio) in determining the offer price. To be 
specific, Non-State IPOs have an average P/E ratio of 16.9, whereas State and 
                                                 
13 The number of shares to calculate historical profits is the number of shares existing prior to the 
issuing.  
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State-Legal Entity IPOs have P/E ratios of 19.8 and 18.6, respectively. Similarly, 
a much smaller percentage of Non-State IPOs (52.9%) receive P/E ratios above 
the median when compared to State IPOs (81.8%) and State-Legal Entity IPOs 
(77.5%), a difference that is significant at the 1% level. Taken together, these 
results provide additional evidence that firms that are politically connected receive 
significant benefits in the going public process as evidenced by being priced more 
aggressively in terms of P/E ratios. 
  Finally, we report in Panel C univariate results of the level of underpricing 
between the more- and the less-connected IPOs. We define More Connected IPOs 
to be those that have at least two forms (the median value of our Connection 
Index variable in the full sample) of political connections identified in this paper 
and Less Connected to be those that have one or no connections. Therefore, More 
Connected state-owned IPOs would refer to those state-owned firms that have 
Connected Bookrunner or Connected Board or both. And More Connected non-
State IPOs refer to those non-State firms that have both Connected Bookrunner 
and Connected Board. Results reported in column 1 and 2 show that More 
Connected firms experience an average underpricing of 104.7%, 32.6% lower 
than those Less Connected firms at 1% significance level. Furthermore, with 
significantly lower prior profits, those More Connected firms were able to get an 
average Actual P/E ratio of 19.504, significantly higher than those Less 
Connected ones. 
  State-owned firms are not entitled to all the benefits that may be brought by 
political connections. As shown in column 3 and 4, More Connected state-owned 
firms experience an average underpricing of 104.6%, 34.7% lower than those Less 
Connected state-owned ones. In fact, without strong political connections, state-
owned firms experience almost same level of underpricing as those Less 
Connected non-state IPOs do (139.3% vs. 132.9%). We also show that non-state 
IPOs with more connections are better off than those with fewer connections, 
although the difference is not significant in several comparisons due to the fact 
that there are only 5 non-State IPOs that have two forms of political connections. 
  Summarizing, Table 5 indicates that political connections tend to increase the 
offer price a firm going public can receive by enabling them to obtain a higher 
than median value P/E multiplier, thereby contributing to a lower level of 
underpricing and thus leaving less money on the table. The univariate analysis 
also provides evidence indicating that political connections are not redundant 
measurements of ownership in exploring the process of the going public because 
we show that without strong political connections, state-owned firms are not 
treated significantly differently from non-State firms. However, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously given that these are univariate results and we 




5 Regression  analysis 
5.1  Political connections and the pricing of IPOs 
To examine the impact of political connections on the pricing of IPOs, we 
estimate a logit model to determine the probability of a firm getting a higher than 
median P/E ratio. Results are reported in Table 6. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the issuing firm gets a higher P/E 
ratio than the median value (14.5), and zero otherwise. Models 1 to 5 report the 
results from the logit analysis for each measure of political connections. Models 6 
to 10 report the results when we add control variables to the regressions. Finally, 
model 11 reports the results for the sub-sample of Non-State IPOs. The marginal 
effect of each variable is reported in the brackets below the p-value. 
  We find that there is a positive and statistically significant probability of 
getting a higher than the median P/E ratio if firms are politically connected.
14 This 
relation holds irrespective of the measure of political connections used. 
Specifically, having connected board members increase the likelihood of getting a 
higher P/E ratio by 16.3%, and using connected bookrunners increase the 
likelihood by 9.3%. State-owned firms have a 10.9% higher likelihood of getting 
a higher multiplier, and firms controlled by the central government have a slightly 
higher likelihood of getting a higher P/E ratio than firms that are controlled by 
other SOEs. Finally, the connection index variable shows that the increase in 
average connectedness by one percent increases the likelihood of getting a higher 
than the median P/E by 13.3%. 
  We conjectured earlier that given that one of the goals of the creation of the 
security markets is to raise funds for indebted State-Owned firms, all else equal, 
firms with higher leverage ratios would be more likely to get a relatively higher 
offer price. To test this conjecture, we include the total debt ratio in the regression 
equation. We also include a Hi-Tech dummy variable
15 so as to control the 
potential impact that being a hi-tech firm could have on the offer price. To control 
for the effect of size we include the logarithm of the total assets. We also include 
Tradable Shares in the regression, which are the shares that are freely tradable in 
the secondary markets. The results show that leverage has a positive and 
significant impact on the firms’ likelihood of getting a higher P/E ratio. 
Specifically, we find that a 1% increase in the leverage ratio has an impact that 
ranges from a low of 21% (model 6) to a high of 29% (model 10). For Non-State 
IPOs, having any one of the two forms of political connections increases the 
likelihood of getting a higher P/E ratio by 23.5%. In contrast to their State-Owned 
                                                 
14 The results hold if we include year dummies. 
15 The results remain quantitatively same if replacing the Hi-Tech with industry dummy variable.  
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counterparts leverage does not help Non-State IPOs in gaining a higher multiplier 
for their offer price. 
  Lowry and Schwert (2004) analyze the efficiency of the IPO pricing process 
in the US market, where after an initial range of offering prices is set by the 
underwriters, the offer price is determined subsequent to the road show and prior 
to the issuing date. Although the process of IPO pricing is totally different in 
China’s security markets, underwriters also play a very important role in the going 
public process. Instead of an offering price range, as pointed out earlier there is a 
P/E ratio range that is used to calculate the offering price, which is preset by the 
government. Investment banks, which are also state-owned in China, influence the 
pricing of IPOs through their impact on the assigned P/E ratio. We find that 
connected bookrunners help issuing firms get relatively higher P/E ratios and 
therefore higher offer prices which lead to a larger amount of capital being raised. 
This is particular the case for state-owned firms. This result provides support for 
the assertion that one of the goals of the government in the development of the 
capital markets is to be able to fund the state-owned firms thus alleviating their 
massive debt burdens. In general, the results that state owned firms benefit the 
most from connected investment banks are similar to those of Sapienza’s (2004) 
who finds that state-owned commercial banks provide a mechanism through 
which patronage is supplied in security markets. 
 
 
5.2  Political connections and the degree of underpricing 
Table 7 presents OLS regression analysis of the impact of political connections on 
underpricing. The dependent variable is initial returns measured as the percentage 
change between the closing price of the first trading day and the offer price.
16 
Models 1 to 5 report the results of underpricing on the different measures of 
political connections. All results are corrected for heteroscadasticity using White’s 
correction. The results indicate that irrespective of the measure used, political 
connections have a statistically significant and economically meaningful negative 
relationship with the level of underpricing. As expected, State shares that are 
under the control of the central government and its agents reduce the level of 
underpricing more significantly than their State-Legal Entity counterparts. This is 
consistent with our earlier arguments that state-owned firms in which the tie with 
the central government is not as strong, will receive less support during the going 
public process. 
  To examine if the relation between the level of underpricing and political 
connections hold after including control variables, in Models 6 to 12 we report 
                                                 
16 The results hold if we use the percentage change between the closing pricing of the 7th trading 
day/15th trading day and the offer price.  
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regressions with additional independent variables. Hi-Tech takes the value of one 
if the issuing firm is from the hi-tech industry. Standard deviation (STDV) is our 
proxy for risk. Oversubscription is a measurement of the demand of a particular 
stock, and is expected to have a positive effect on underpricing. ∆Actual P/E is the 
difference between the actual P/E ratio that a firm gets to determine its offer price 
and the median value of the range of P/E ratio suggested by the government 
during the sample period. The higher is the ∆Actual P/E, the more likely it is that 
for a given level of profitability the issued shares are priced above the median. If 
investors in the secondary market realize this information and bid accordingly on 
the first trading day, they might bid less vigorously for those that are already 
priced higher than the median. Additionally, we also consider Tradable Shares in 
the estimation.
17 
  The results indicate that the observed relationships between the level of 
underpricing and the political connections hold even when the control variables 
are included in the regressions. Hi-Tech IPOs and IPOs with more uncertainty 
have a higher level of underpricing. Consistent with our expectations, 
oversubscription is significant and positive, while ∆Actual P/E has a negative and 
significant relationship. Interestingly, the proportion of the amount of tradable 
shares has significant and positive relationship with the level of underpricing and 
the results suggest that it mainly driven by state-owned firms. Since we have 
shown in table 6 that Tradable Shares do not impact the P/E ratio a firm obtains 
(that determines the offering price), the significant and positive relationship 
between Tradable Shares and underpricing indicates that more shares of a firm, 
especially a state-owned firm, are issued to the public, higher the first day trading 
price is, given everything else equal. 
  Model 11 reports the estimation results for Non-State IPOs, among which, the 
ones with political connections experience significantly lower underpricing. The 
results indicate that political connections also have a negative effect on the 
underpricing of Non-State IPOs. In un-tabulated results we rerun the Non-State 
regression with only STDV as the independent variable. We also ran a similar 
regression for the entire sample. We find that for the entire sample the adjusted R-
square is only 3.3%. In contrast, for the Non-State IPO sample the adjusted R-
square is 13.5%. The finding that STDV explains the variation in underpricing 
better in Non-State IPOs than it does in State-Owned IPOs is consistent with the 
notion that shares of State-Owned firms provide a less risky investment 
opportunity because it is customary for the government to bail-out or subsidize 
SOEs when they are in trouble.  
 
                                                 
17 Since the conjecture about the impact of political connections on the process of going public 
suggests that the offering size may be endogenous, in the unreported table, we show that the sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients hold when we include the instrumented size variable as a 
regressor.  
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5.3  Political connections and the cost of going public 
We collected issuing cost information from the individual prospectuses. Most of 
the issuing firms report their issuing costs as a lump sum and only a few provide 
detailed information. By examining those who do report detailed costs we find 
that most of the fees (about 60%) are paid to the underwriting syndicates.
18 Thus, 
unlike in the US where the underwriter spread is 7% (Chen and Ritter (2000)), 
there is no evidence of a 7% spread (or any particular number) when firms go 
public in China. Because we are not able to get syndicate fees for each IPO, we 
use the total issuing costs as a proxy for the underwriting fees in the analysis that 
follows. 
  Table 8 presents the regressions of the issuing costs as a percentage of the 
total proceeds raised. Models 1 to 5 report regression results on political 
connections. Connected board and both types of State-Owned shares significantly 
reduce the total cost of going public. Connected bookrunners are also related to 
lower percentage of fees paid although only at marginal significance levels. It is 
reasonable to assume that although connected bookrunners might reduce their 
clients’ average cost of going public there is still great demand for their services. 
This suggests that having a connected bookrunner would only have a modest 
impact on reducing the costs of going public. Consistent with our previous 
conjecture we find that being a State firm reduces the cost of going public more so 
than State-Legal Entity firms. However, the economic impact is modest as 
reflected in the size of the coefficient. 
  Models 6 to 10 report regression results when we add control variables. We 
use a relative size measure defined as issue size over total assets prior to going 
public to control for any possible size effect. In the analysis of the pricing process 
of IPOs, the results suggest that politically connected bookrunners may increase 
the P/E ratio an issuing firm gets so as to increase the offer price. Here we 
investigate whether firms with lower profitability pay higher issuing costs to 
investment banks so as to get a higher P/E ratio. We find that there is a negative 
and significant relation between profits and issuing costs. To be specific, we find 
that a one dollar increase in profits per share reduce issuing cost per dollar raised 
by 0.017 dollar. We also find that firms with lower issuing size relative to total 
assets prior to the offering tend to pay higher costs of going public. Importantly, 
the political connections variables are still significant after we control for size and 
the quality of the issuing firms. Model 11 reports the regression for Non-State 
                                                 
18 For example, for stock ‘Yun Tian Hua’, ticker code ‘600096’, among the 14 million RMB of 
issuing costs, 8.52 million (60%) is paid to the underwriting syndicate, 0.58 million (4%) to the 
accounting firms, 0.55 million (3.9%) to asset evaluation firms, 0.4 million (2.9%) to law firms, 
0.6 million (4.3%) to the sponsor of going public, 0.2 million (1.4%) to financial consultants, 0.32 
million (2.3%) to registration office, 0.8 million (5.7%) traveling fees, and 2 million (14.3%) other 
fees.  
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IPOs only. Similar to the results for State-Owned, all else equal, Non-State IPOs 
with political connections tend to pay less issuing costs. 
 
 
5.4 Robustness  test 
The analysis of the pricing of IPOs, the level of underpricing, and the cost of 
going public indicate that IPOs with less political connections are treated less 
preferentially during the process of going public than those with more 
connections. A relevant question then is if they were politically more connected, 
at what offer price would they issue shares given the same characteristics and how 
much underpricing would they experience? To examine these questions, we 
perform OLS regressions to determine which factors might impact the actual P/E 
ratios received by More Connected IPOs and use the coefficients from these 
regressions to predict the P/E ratios that Less Connected IPOs would have 
received if they were strongly connected. The regression that we use to estimate 
the actual P/E ratios for More Connected IPOs is as follows 
 
P/E =  31.014 – 40.650 * Prior Profits/Share + 0.221 * Debt/Asset 
  + 30.334 * Issuing Costs/Proceeds + 0.066 * Exchange  (5.1) 
  – 0.493 * Hi-Tech + ε 
 
Using the coefficients from equation (5.1), we predict the P/E ratio that Less 
Connected IPOs would have received if they were treated like their More 
Connected counterparts. Table 9 reports the results from these predictions. The 
average of the predicted P/E ratios for Less Connected IPOs is 28.018, about 
10.488 higher than the actual P/E ratio they received and the differences is 
significant at the 1% level. The increased P/E ratios would lead to a higher 
average offering price of RMB 9.352, which is RMB 3.056 higher than the actual 
offer price and the difference is significant at the 1% level. The increased offer 
price would reduce Less Connected IPOs’ underpricing by 73.5% to 63.9%. The 
decrease is significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that if Less 
Connected IPOs were treated the same as their More Connected counterparts, they 
would have received a higher P/E ratio, which would lead to a higher offer price 
and hence, all else equal, a significantly lower degree of underpricing. 
  When breaking down the sample into State, State-Legal Entity, and non-State 
firms by the strength of the connection, the evidence suggests that less connected 
State and State-Legal Entity firms would have received significantly higher P/E 
ratios if treated as their more connected counterparts, resulting in significantly 
higher offer price and therefore lower underpricing. The same pattern exists in 
non-State firms however the differences are not statistically significant primarily  
29 
due to the fact that only 5 of the 51 non-State sample firms are more connected 
relative to others thus contributing to the insignificant statistical results. 
 
 
6 Concluding  remarks 
The extant literature has shown that political connections impact firm value. 
Specifically, researchers have attempted to quantify the value that political 
connections help to create or destroy for firms from the perspective of borrowing 
terms, bail-outs from bankruptcy, long-run performance and financing strategies. 
Yet one of the most important decisions in the life of a firm, the going public 
process, has not been formally addressed. Our paper tries to fill this void by 
examining the role of political connections in firms’ going public process. 
Specifically we examine the pricing of IPOs, the level of underpricing and the 
fixed cost of going public. 
  This study extends this literature not only by introducing explicit measures of 
political connections but also by linking these connections to the going public 
process. We use the experience of newly public companies in China’s security 
markets, where the market environment, the intermediation process, regulations, 
and practices are most suitable for such an empirical test. The evidence reveals 
that political connections play a very important role in the going public process. 
To be specific, political connections have a statistically significant and 
economically meaningful effect on the formation of the offer price, the degree of 
underpricing and the other costs associated with going public. These results are 
robust to different measures of political connections and to both State-owned and 
Non-State firms. 
  Our study indicates that political connections are valuable to firms. This 
implies that firms that lack political connections may have to accept less 
preferable treatment or seek other costly options in order to relax capital 
constraints. We therefore provide an explanation for the findings of Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2005) that non-connected firms are more inclined to seek global 
financing than well-connected firms. The magnitude of the impact of connections 
on the value of the economy as a whole, however, cannot be deduced from the 
results of this study. The costs may include but not limited to the resources that 
are applied to pursue and maintain the political connections and the costs of 
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Table 1    Political connections of underwriters 
 
This Table presents the top 5 ranked underwriters according to their participation in the 
100 largest government IPOs. The ranking and sales data are based on information from 
1994 to 1999 and are collected from Securities Data Corporation League Table. Total 
Proceeds Raised is denominated in US dollars. Involvement in the 100 Largest 
Government IPOs refers to the amount of proceeds raised by those underwriters as a 
percentage of the total proceeds raised of the 100 largest government IPOs; Number of 
the 100 Largest State-Owned IPOs Underwritten refers to the number of the 100 largest 
government IPOs that the underwriter acts as the bookrunner; and Main Owner refers to 
















Guo Tai Jun An  1809.35  21.73%  20  Central bank 
Zhong Xin  1306.38  15.69%  11  State council 
Shen Yin Wang Guo  982.97  11.81%  11  Shanghai 
government 
Guang Da  449.09  5.39%  5  State council 
Nang Fang  406.95  4.89%  5  Central bank 
Total 5528.27  66.39%  59   
  
36 
Table 2    Ownership structures of IPO firms prior to an 
     after  issuings 
 
This figure shows the types of ownership of IPO firms prior to and after the initial public 
offerings. Panel A presents the ownership structure prior to the issuings. State-Owned 
refers to shares owned by the State in total. There are two types of State-Owned shares: 
State and State-Legal Entity. State shares refer to shares owned and managed by the 
government agencies or authorized institutions, eg ‘State owned assets supervision and 
administration commission’. State-Legal Entity shares refer to shares managed by State-
Owned companies. Panel B shows the ownership structure after the issuings. All State-
Owned and Non-State shares are not tradable. Tradable shares refer to the shares that are 
freely tradable in the secondary markets. Initial Public Offerings refer to the shares 
offered when the firms go public. 
 
Panel A. Prior to the issuance. 
Ownership type  Percentage of shares controlled 
State 25% 
State-legal entity  44% 




Panel B. After the issuings 
Ownership type  Publicly tradable  Percentage of shares controlled 
State No  17.5% 
State-legal entity  No  30.8% 
Subtotal: state-owned  No  48.3% 
Non-state No  21.7% 
InitialpPublic offerings  Yes  30% 
Total   100% 
  
37 
Table 3    The distribution of industrial A-share IPOs from 
      1994 to 1999 
 
This Table presents the distribution of IPOs included in the sample by industry and by 
firm type. The sample does not include IPOs by financial firms. State refers to IPOs 
issued by firms with controlling shares owned by central government or its authorized 
agents; State-Legal Entity refers to IPOs issued by firms with controlling shares owned 
by State-Owned enterprises; Non-State refers to IPOs issued by firms with controlling 
shares owned by Non-State enterprises. The industry information is retrieved from SDC. 
 
Industry  State State-legal  entity Non-state  Sum 
Agriculture 2  7  2  11 
Construction 4  5 0  9 
Electric service  2  2  1  5 
Manufacturing 106  138  35  279 
Natural resource  1  8  0  9 
Pers/bus/rep svc  7  6  2  15 
Radio/TV/Telecom 1  1  0  2 
Real estate  0  1  0  1 
Regional agency  0  0  1  1 
Restaurant/hotel 2  1  1  4 
Retail 1  2  0  3 
Telephone 
communication  0 1  0 1 
Transportation 5  10  2  17 
Wholesale 28  31  7  66 
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